Last Friday I went to the Museum of Natural History on the National Mall. That museum with dinosaur bones and nature dioramas. (And, oddly enough, a temporary exhibition on baseball.) And metal detectors with guards who opened your bags.
I renew my objections to these new "security" measures.
To begin with, there is the inconvenience factor. This was palpable on Friday when I was trying to meet my friend, and I couldn't very easily pop inside to look to see if he was already there because of the line to enter through security. I will grant that if inconvenience itself were the only objection it might not weigh heavily against the possible benefit.
But the inconvenience factor is only the tip of the iceberg. There's also the loss of civil liberties, the expenditure of resources on ineffective measures that create only the APPEARANCE of security, the resulting lack of resources available to provide any ACTUAL security, and the fact that the inconvenience of convening freely in a public place has a wider destructive effect on society than one individual may appear to absorb on his own.
When I went to the museum it was after work, to which I normally carry a backpack with my laptop, papers, and whatever else I feel like lugging around with me all day. To enter the museum I had to permit my bag to be searched.
Here I can hear people argue, "So? How is that a problem if you have nothing to hide?"
This argument is always fallacious. Personal liberty entitles you to hide whatever you want from the State that you want, however capriciously. If I've written an essay that I think later is really bad, and I'd be so mortified if anyone read it, though there would be no criminal repercussions should it fall into the hands of the State, I still would have reason to want no one to see it. Not my friends, not my neighbors, and certainly not my government.
And what about items that aren’t illicit but the prying eyes of the State's agents wouldn't be able to ascertain as such? Like, say, material that might be deemed obscene, or worse. If I wrote an essay on how much I dislike President Bush – or even an essay like this – if an agent of the State should see it, how could I be sure that I wouldn't get arrested as a terrorist? A treasonist? Someone who by not being "with us" must be against us? True my First Amendment right of free expression could provide a defense, but having to endure a trial to be exonerated on that point is a tremendous cost (and risk) that should not and would not have to be born if I actually had a Fourth Amendment right "to be secure in [my] person[], houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
The Fourth Amendment goes on to describe a legitimate search as one which "upon probable cause ... particularly describ[es] the persons or things to be seized." The mere desire to enter a museum, a park, or any other public space cannot on its own be sufficient probable cause to justify a search. Nor can searching EVERYONE with such a desire be sufficiently particular. Plus, once the State gets to look at my belongings, it can now "see" whatever it wants. Including all the things that for whatever reason I wouldn't want it to see and might ordinarily have been able to prevent from being searched.
The loss of Fourth Amendment protection in order to enter these locales, which used to be freely available to be freely exploited by all citizens, having already been paid for by them, is a very high additional cost indeed and one which is expensive for society as a whole. If people need to subject themselves to State scrutiny to partake in public events, more and more people will have to forgo them. So, you might say, these would be the "bad guys" and we wouldn't want them around anyway. It's a matter for a separate discussion how society denotes its "good guys from bad guys," but it can be noted here that it's not the rare psychopath that gets weeded out by these searches but mere scofflaws and dissidents that will be caught up in this net. These are the people who perhaps have something naughty but innocuous in their possession – or perhaps they don't even – but who, even on the fringes of society still have something to contribute to it, to say nothing of a right to partake in it. Ridding ourselves of their participation deprives the fabric of our society of their color and further marginalizes them.
The convenience issue is even more relevant in this context. If it stops being efficient to attend public events or to enter public institutions, people won't. Or at least not as often. Even the most conforming people will be reluctant to endure the hassle. If we think it's valuable to have free public educational institutions and assemblage areas, we should ensure that people can take advantage of them. The investment won't pay off if, practically, people are unable to use them. Particularly for educational institutions, when the betterment and stability of society depends so heavily on having an informed populace, this outcome is particularly untenable.
Meanwhile, many people who find these types of security measures unobjectionable tend to justify them with two arguments, one being that "any little bit helps," and the other being that because public places are easy targets they justify these impositions.
First of all, every little bit DOESN'T help. Swatting mosquitoes when Godzilla is on the loose may keep people from succumbing from West Nile, but it's not going to keep them from getting crushed. It's counterproductive and wasteful to spend so many resources countering small hazards are not dealing with the larger ones. Plus, as I keep reiterating, the cure is worse than the disease. Worse, it's not even a real cure, it's just an illusion of safety that the security measures bring, not anything substantive. Like a traveler in the desert who drinks from a mirage only to ingest a mouthful of sand, so are we when we think that these types of measures do us any good at all.
Secondly, the "easy target" argument doesn't scale very well. BECAUSE people meet in aggregate they are a target. The only solution is to not have people meet in aggregate (which, given the inhibiting nature of these measures, may actually be the goal). Since (we by policy seem to presume) terrorists aren't interested in picking people off one by one, any crowd of people provides a presumptively tempting target.
There might be some argument that the National Mall on Independence Day might be a more poetic target than some other public events, but if so, merely keeping people from bringing in pointy objects did not make anyone any safer. As for museums, perhaps we fear that a terrorist might desecrate a museum exhibit and destroy a piece of our heritage, but though sad and devastating that would be in its own way, the mentality behind 9/11 is not likely to be satisfied with destroying a space capsule or dinosaur skeleton. But if we can make the choice to either risk having an artifact destroyed or our freedom, isn't it better for the former to absorb the damage?
Meanwhile these feeble attempts to make us "safe" seem to only be remotely effective against the run of the mill social outcasts, the "troublemakers." Had there not been any security on the Mall on the Fourth of July I think my greatest vulnerability might have been to stupid people with pointy objects or pistols. That risk might have been ameliorated somewhat – but only somewhat – with the security procedures.
But this raises another issue, which echoes the repeated concern for society's cohesiveness: that we just don't seem to trust each other. When we mingle with strangers, we fear they have it in for us. The security measures are really just a prophylactic attempt to mitigate that fear. All the obstacles and barriers are supposed to parse out the "bad" people, the people whose behavior we don't think we can trust, without us having to learn how we can. Instead we search for a guarantee that no one will hurt us, making ourselves vulnerable to leaders who really can't make that promise anyway.
There is more to say about our alienation from our neighbors and the harmful effects our fear and suspicion have on society as a whole. But for purposes here I want to close by refocusing on general principles, to emphasize how freedom is only attainable when it applies to everyone, even people you don't like (the "bad" people). People who don't look quite the same. People who have negative opinions. People just like you. As bad as it is to parse out dissidents, the worst thing about such an exercise is that there is no defense against having yourself parsed out as well. Maybe someone doesn't like the way you look. Or your opinions. Maintaining civil liberties for all doesn't just protect the freedom of the people on the fringes, it also protects your own.
Actually completed and posted on 7/18. But I'd been drafting it in my head all the previous week.