Apr 032017
 

As the nomination of Judge Gorsuch for the vacant seat on the US Supreme Court continues to move forward, I find myself, as someone who generally characterizes herself as liberal and who tends to “vote blue,” torn.

Given my policy predilections there are in fact some significant reasons to favor his nomination. In particular he seems willing and able to clip the wings of government power when it tries to act beyond its authority. In light of a presidential administration that seems inclined to flex its muscles far beyond the bounds of how the Constitution permits it to, those sorts of libertarian leanings could be an important check on executive abuse, abuse that often targets liberal values.

On the other hand, although his jurisprudence on the subject is thin, miscellaneous comments he’s made about reproductive freedom make me concerned that his notion of individual liberty does not extend to a woman’s right of self-determination over her own body. Similarly, the hearings suggested that he may lack sufficient empathy for the lives his jurisprudence will touch. While I don’t generally agree that all liberal policies are necessarily a good idea, or constitutionally permissible, the intent behind them has always struck me as inherently valid and consistent with what it takes to form this more perfect union. Too much pushback against these policies, particularly when rooted in obliviousness to how Americans of differing backgrounds find themselves needing to live their lives, will not lead to liberty and justice for all.

And yet Gorsuch is educated, capable, and presumably persuadable. He is not a rabid ideologue. Thus there remains the concern for what might happen if his nomination is rebuffed and the next candidate put forth is.

It is hard to know how to counsel Democrats to proceed. There is a significant risk in rejecting him. On top of tempting an even worse candidate now, the mechanics of resistance, of pushing the filibuster and daring it to be destroyed, may remove it as an option to use against a worse candidate in the future. On the other hand, there’s no guarantee that it couldn’t be destroyed later, for that worse candidate.

Furthermore, Democrats still have two significant structural concerns about proceeding with Gorsuch’s appointment, concerns apart from qualms about his jurisprudence and that can’t simply be dismissed. Continue reading »

Jun 202016
 

In light of today’s Fourth Amendment-eroding Supreme Court decision in Utah v. Streif, and Justice Sotomayor’s scathing indictment of it:

The Court today holds that the discovery of a warrant for an unpaid parking ticket will forgive a police officer’s violation of your Fourth Amendment rights. Do not be soothed by the opinion’s technical language: This case allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your identification, and check it for outstanding traffic warrants—even if you are doing nothing wrong. If the officer discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay, courts will now excuse his illegal stop and will admit into evidence anything he happens to find by searching you after arresting
you on the warrant. Because the Fourth Amendment should prohibit, not permit, such misconduct, I dissent.

I thought I would repost something I wrote in law school about an earlier Supreme Court decision, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, that ran roughshod over the idea that people might have a constitutional right — and need — to refuse to identify themselves to the police. Given, as Justice Sotomayor notes, that such an identification can lead to other incursions on one’s liberty I think it’s worth remembering some of the earlier jurisprudence that has brought us to where we are with this case today.

(Originally posted 3/23/04. I’ve edited the writing slightly now to make sure the point I was trying to make back then are more clearly conveyed now, but I have not otherwise edited it for substance. While today I would tend to frame my legal analysis slightly differently, I think the rough take of a 1L still captures valid concerns that today’s ruling exemplifies and exacerbates.)
Continue reading »